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ABSTRACT: Experience is one of the most used terms in (science) education, and it is
recognized as being related to learning (education). Yet what experience is and how it is
related to learning and change remains untheorized. In this paper, we mainly draw on the
work of J. Dewey and L. S. Vygotsky but also on M. Bakhtin and more recent advances on
the topic of experience from French philosophy to contribute to a theory of this important
category. Accordingly, experience is not something that belongs to or is had by individuals
but rather denotes transactions in and across space and time within irreducible person-
in-setting units; and it is perfused with an affect that is not (only) the result of mental
constructions. An episode from an Australian physics classroom is used to exemplify what
such a theory and its method-related implications have to accomplish in the analysis of
concrete science lessons. C© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Sci Ed 98:106–126, 2014
INTRODUCTION
Experience, in its fundamental sense, is that which, by putting us in play ourselves, modifies
us profoundly in a way that after having crossed, endured, traversed it, we will never be the
same again: undergo an illness, mourning, joy, loving, traveling, writing a book, painting
are “experiences” in the first philosophical sense, surely simple, but nevertheless trivial.
(Romano, 1998, p. 197)
Stating that we learn in and through experience is a truism. Thus, science educators
can unproblematically state that “[a]dult learners learn from their experiences,” “for most
people the ability to accurately define the concept of homeostasis was directly tied to
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their experiences at the Science Center” (Falk & Needham, 2011, p. 10), “developmentally
appropriate engagement with quality science learning experiences can enhance children’s
development of science skills” (Sac¸kes, Trundle, Bell, & O’Connell, 2011, p. 218), or
“I use my own experience as a data source” (Wallace, 2012, p. 292, emphasis added).
Yet the concept of experience remains troubling and undertheorized (Wong, Pugh, & the
Dewey Ideas Group at Michigan State University, 2001). As is apparent in the quotations,
a distinction is frequently made between experience and learning, where the former is
said to precede or affect the latter. However, these accounts tend to focus “on the impact
of experience on learning and have much less to say about the impact of learning on
experience” (Pugh, 2011, p. 109). Rather, for experience to have analytical import in
science education, there is a need to theorize what experience is.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to re/theorizing experience by emphasizing
critical moments of the category in the work of Dewey and Vygotsky and interpreting them
with regard to more recent developments in phenomenological philosophy. We begin by
providing an initial sketch of the category of experience and then move to present some case
material and a reading thereof that focuses on experience from a pragmatic perspective. We
then offer some theoretical discussion and development for the purpose of working toward
a theory of the category of experience.
Experience: An Initial Sketch
Experience, as treated by Dewey and Vygotsky, is unlike the common use of the term as
referring to participation in events or activities and, in the process, having certain feelings.
Instead, experience is a category of thinking, a minimal unit of analysis that includes
people (their intellectual, affective, and practical characteristics), their material and social
environment, their transactional relations (mutual effects on each other), and affect. Thus,
experience is not something concealed within individuals, but extends in space and time
across individuals and setting in the course of temporally unfolding societal relations, which
themselves are perfused with affect (Vygotskij, 1935/2001). Therefore, coming to grips with
what it means to have an experience implies providing an account of how societal events—
including school science lessons—are produced in ongoing society-specific interactional
forms, and how in turn these events give raise to the social interaction itself. To this end,
we need to theorize experience not as a synchronic category, an entity that can be named
before its course has reached an end. It has to be considered as an unfolding unit that
encompasses change itself, rather than change being an external factor causing or affecting
experience.
Important groundwork has been laid by the American pragmatist philosopher Dewey,
who emphasized the continuous nature of experience and distinguished experience in
general from having an experience, that is, when an event that we have lived has run its
course and comes to a determinate conclusion—a consummation (Dewey, 1934/2008a).
Virtually unknown is the fact that Vygotskij (1935/2001), too, worked on a theory of
experience that has the same essential characteristics. It is precisely this type of experience
that science educators need to theorize to better understand learning in all of its dimensions
(Lidar, Almqvist, & ¨Ostman, 2010). As such, an experience stands out as something special
against the stream of experiences generally. However, there are only a few scholars who
directly take up and emphasize the role of Dewey’s work on pertinent issues in science
education (e.g., Girod, Rau, & Schepige, 2003; Rudolph, 2005; Wickman, 2006; Wickman
& Ostman, 2002). Notwithstanding these efforts, a critical analysis of the category of
experience may be a timely and important task because it addresses the question of unit of
analysis, a question that is central to recent sociocultural and situative theories that strive
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to provide holistic accounts of the relations in which individual and environment mutually
determine each other, and relations between the situational and continuous aspects of
knowing and learning (e.g., Greeno, 2006; Hamza & Wickman, 2009; Lidar, Almqvist, &
¨Ostman, 2010; Rogoff, 1995; Roth & Jornet, 2013).
Both Dewey and Vygotsky conceived of experience as a category for understanding
learning and development, that is, as the minimum analytic unit that retains all the fea-
tures of the whole (Dewey, 1938/2008b; Vygotskij, 1935/2001). For Dewey, experience
denoted a functional transaction that both constituted and transformed subjects and their
environments in the course of practical activity (Garrison, 2001). The term transaction
means that participating terms—for example, acting subject and environment—cannot be
independently specified because each is a part of the other (Dewey & Bentley, 1949/1999).
Similarly, in a cultural–historical concrete human psychological theory, experience con-
stitutes the developmental unit that considers the inner (emotions, consciousness) and
outer (material, social environment) as integral parts of one irreducible unit (Vygotskij,
1935/2001). In fact, Vygotskij’s Russian word perezˇivanie, besides experience, also has the
English “emotion” or “feeling” as equivalents, so that the English translation of Vygotskij
(1935/2001) uses “emotional experience” to translate the term (Vygotsky, 1994).1 That is,
experience—and even more so, the Russian perezˇivanie—integrates the physical–practical,
intellectual, and affective moments of the human life form that interpenetrate each other
(Dewey, 1938/2008a; Vygotskij, 1984).
An important implication of the view on experience sketched here is that, if the physical–
practical, intellectual, and affective moments of experience cannot be considered as fac-
tors standing above or below each other, experience cannot be reduced to and therefore
explained by (mental) construction and interpretation. The irreducibility of experience to
mental constructions is central to more recent work in phenomenological philosophy, which
emphasizes that we are not only subjects of experience but also subject and subjected to
experience (e.g., Romano, 1998; Waldenfels, 2011). In this, experience always is in excess
of cognitive construction. There is therefore, a tremendous excess of experience over intel-
lectual subject matter learning (Dewey calls it “collateral learning”). This excess may be
even more important to learning than what is or is not learned in the subject matter (Marion,
2010; Roth, 2012a). It may also allow us to come to grips with the fact that so many students
drop a science course or drop out of science altogether in the course of taking courses. This
excess of actual over intended learning includes what Dewey refers to as “attitudes,” and
these “attitudes are fundamentally what count in the future” (Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 29).
There is therefore, a need to theorize experience in terms that do not assume “control and
rationality” as the “sine qua non” of learning (Wong, 2007, p. 192). It also implies a need
to develop analytical accounts that retain the inherent uncertainty that is an integral part of
human experience.
FROM THE FLUX OF EXPERIENCE ARISES AN EXPERIENCE
Introduction
In this section, we present a brief classroom event that serves us to highlight some of the
basic traits of the category of experience sketched above and to empirically ground further
theoretical development in a subsequent section. The event presented is interesting because
1We do not follow this practice, as Vygotsky clearly uses an adjective to to qualify the noun “experience,”
that is, he writes “emotional experience [emocional’nyx perezˇivanie]” (Vygotskij, 1984, p. 45). Moreover,
he uses phrases such as the “experience of feelings [perezˇivanie perezˇivanij]” (Vygotskij, 2005, p. 30).
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it will have turned out to have been an experience in Dewey’s sense (1934/2008a). We use
the future perfect tense, because as things were unfolding, neither teacher nor student knew
that this instant of the physics course would eventually stand out as something significant.
Whereas the category experience refers to the continuous transactions that are characteristic
of “the very process of living” (p. 42), an experience stands out as a completed (i.e., the
result of human action) and complete whole that can be distinguished against the “inchoate”
flux of experience and named: “Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated
in the general stream of experience from other experiences” (p. 42). The classroom event
presented here can be counted as an experience, because the participants themselves marked
it as something that had stood out for them in this particular lesson and because of its stated
impact on both participants. During the interview following the lesson, the teacher (Carrie)
said that it was salient because she “had to tell Jane (a student) that we’ve changed her
topic.” The researcher who was interviewing her, by using the demonstrative pronoun
“that” in asking Jane whether “that is back to the drawing board for you,” referred to the
event that he had just witnessed passing as some thing that can be referred to. Jane, in her
response, also used a pronoun “it” to refer to the event: “it sucks” and “it’s annoying.” We
therefore may legitimately qualify the event as “an experience,” because it “is a whole and
carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency” (Dewey, 1934/2008a, p.
42), something of “tremendous importance—a quarrel” or “something that stands out as
an enduring memorial” (p. 43). Such experiences are of tremendous importance because
“every successive part flows freely, without seam and without unfilled blanks, into what
ensues” (p. 43). Such experiences constitute unities. As unities, we can name or denote
them (“that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship,” Dewey, 1934/2008a, p. 43).
Dewey emphasized the fact that young people in traditional schools do have experiences.
However, he suggested that not all experiences lead to “growth” or become significant in
some other way. For him, educators should “arrange for the kind of experiences which,
while they do not repel the student, but rather engage his activities are, nevertheless,
more than immediately enjoyable, since they promote having desirable future experiences”
(1938/2008b, p. 13). Such experiences are those that bear developmental continuity on
a personal plane and which, in a social relation, can be named and therefore referred to
as common. As apparent in the participants’ later accounts, the episode here presented
had a lasting impact in the way both student and teacher further engaged in the course
of future science learning. Central to our effort of working toward a theory of experience
is that the episode from the classroom constitutes an event arising from and irreducibly
intertwined with the societal relation of the participants. Such relations are to be understood
as a category, “as [an] emotionally colored and experiencing collision, the contradiction
between the two people” (Veresov, 2010, p. 273). The dramatic encounter “emotionally
and mentally experienced as a social drama . . . later becomes [an] individual intra-
psychological category” (p. 273). In the analyses that follow, therefore, we demonstrate
how an understanding of both the agential and pathic (affective, emotional) dimensions
of experience is possible once we, as analysts, acknowledge the primacy of the societal
relation—which encompasses transaction—and describe the practices by which the relation
is recognizably reproduced and accounted for by the participants while it is a relation in
the making.
Background to the Event
The event reported below was recorded during a physics curriculum unit in which 11th-
grade students involving several classes conducted an extended experimental investigation
in a private high school in an urban setting of Queensland, Australia. The students, working
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individually or in pairs, completed one from about six proposed investigations that would
take them an entire term to complete. The problem statements were deliberately framed in
general form to allow students a great degree of latitude in just what they wanted to inves-
tigate and how they wanted to do it. One of the investigations involved a lantern, which,
in the original problem framing, was to be made to rise using tea-light candles: “Design
and make a [paper] lantern powered by a single tea-light that takes the shortest time (from
lighting the candle) to float up a vertical height of 2.5 m. Investigate the influence of the
relevant parameters. (Please take care not to create a risk of fire!)” The students were to
write a report to be submitted at the end of the 10-week term. This would constitute the
only form of assessment for this period of the course. The episode occurred in the second
week of the term, when the head of the department had changed the problem definition
(which students and teacher could access “on Moodle”). In the episode, the teacher Carrie
(a former research engineer who, following a teacher-education program, was in her first
year) is informing Jane about the change. (Pseudonyms are used throughout.) In addition
to the classroom video, which also features a brief interview with Jane about the event im-
mediately thereafter, we also draw on three interviews in which Carrie talks about teaching
physics by means of the state-mandated extended experimental investigations. In the fol-
lowing, we provide a narrative account of the episode that the participants themselves will
be marking as an experience. We include descriptions of both the prosodic and nonprosodic
aspects of the conversation featured in the episode, as those constitute the empirical material
on which our research draws.2
Getting a Student to Change Her Topic in a Student-Centered Extended
Experimental Investigation
What eventually will have been event that stood out for the participants and observer
began when Carrie walked toward one of the laboratory benches where Jane was sitting
saying sufficiently loud for Jane and others to hear that she better talk to Jane first. After a
brief pause, Carrie adds, “change of plans,” which is immediately taken up by what can be
heard as disappointment. In fact, Carrie then acts as if she were reacting to disappointment
by giving a reason for the change of plans: “to make life easier” because “it” “is too
difficult.” In what can be heard as a plaintive voice, Jane responds that she has “just found
a way to do it.” Carrie then suggests, beginning with the contrastive conjunction “but” that
marks an objection that “it” “might still work for change of plans.” That is, although we can
witness an apparent attempt on Carrie’s side to accommodate the student, she also reiterates
the change of plan as a fact. Carrie then outlines that the new task definition can be found
on Moodle.3 The two then enact an initiation–reply–evaluation (IRE) ritual, whereby the
teacher initiates a query concerning an alternative way of making the Chinese lantern rise
(“can you think of something,” “like we get hot air from?”), repeatedly responded to by the
student (no response, “breath into it,” “I would say fire”), which is evaluated on the part of
2The full episode and the transcripts of the interviews with Carrie and Jane are provided in Roth, 2013b,
pp. 163–170. The ethnomethodological analyses provided in that book only draw on what the interaction
participants, here Jane and Carrie, make available to each other and act upon. No special methods were
required other than those “ethnomethods” that Jane and Carrie used to make sense, as stated in the subtitle
of the book. The analyses provided there show how every aspect of the episode is collaboratively achieved,
including such aspects as Jane’s plea, change of plans, bringing an end to the experience, etc.
3Moodle is the acronym for Modular Object-Oriented Dynamic Learning Environment that was used in
Jane and Carrie’s school as a common platform for managing courses, such as physics, taught by multiple
teachers and to bring all assignment (specifications) into alignment.
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the teacher (“easier than that”). Despite having first invited Jane to “think of something,” it
is the teacher who finally names the alternative heat source to be used: a hair dryer.
Although there were signs of disappointment initially, addressed in the way Carrie
responded, Jane then participated in the exchange without obvious signs of negatively
tinged affect. But this changed as soon as Jane stated the realization that using the suggested
hair dryer meant that she could not do the experiment with the waxes she had designed.
Carrie assertively repeated the statement that Jane “can’t experiment with different waxes.”
Carrie quite apparently hears the disappointment in Jane’s interjection, as she states what
Jane can actually do (“investigate how you can have a lantern rise in the least amount of
time for two meters”), which the latter accepts in a subdued voice. Although the definition
of an extended experimental investigation states that the students themselves design the
experiment, here it is Carrie who outlines the details about how to heat the air in the lantern.
There are subdued acknowledgments on the part of the student (“kay,” head nod), and a
final comment that reasserts the fact that Jane “won’t be able to test different types of
waxes.”
Jane apparently did not give in, as she began to describe the preparations she has
completed at home and to explain what she was going to do. Carrie, in a subsequent
debriefing interview, articulated this “not giving in” as “balking at it all,” that is, as providing
resistance to the suggestions she made. In the exchange with Carrie, Jane articulated that she
would use candle bases and different waxes she had ordered, how she would use lightweight
tinsel to support the candles and a paper ring, and how she would use baking paper. All this
would make the lantern “go up really easily,” which in fact addressed the principle issue
that had led to the change in task definition.
Carrie suggested that the baking paper above the candle would burn, which is followed
by an exchange over its anticipated interaction with the flame. Jane countered in saying that
it would not burn, but Carrie, who first asked whether the paper would burn then asserted
that it would burn and char, creating holes in it. Using the contrastive conjunction “but”
before stating what she could investigate also marks an insistence on doing the investigation
that she designed rather than what Carrie was in the process of suggesting she ought to
do. Carrie then asks whether it is possible to use the set up that Jane proposes with the
configuration (hair dryer) that she had been suggesting. As the contrastive conjunction
“but” indicates, Jane was hearing Carrie to be suggesting that she abandon her experiment
and then Jane expounded that the lantern would go up no matter what the conditions. Rather
than engaging with Jane’s argument, Carrie then asked Jane to “think about that” and “what
she can do with that” and continued by articulating the mediating conditions that interfered
with making “it” “work.”
Jane, however, was not giving up. She now pleaded for continuing with her plan under
the condition that she could get it to work; but Carrie objected by stating that in this way
Jane would be spending more time trying to make it work, and eventually would be running
out of time. Again, Jane articulated a plea and a promise to do the alternate hair dryer
experiment if she could not get her investigation to work. Carrie did not engage with this
idea but reasserted her suggestion that Jane work on elaborating ideas under the new task
condition and to work at home on the wax experiment. Jane apparently assented, but in a
very subdued manner.
Carrie then offers up a change of topic: the theory (behind the experiment). Asked “how
is your theory writing going,” Jane stated not to have had the time, and Carrie suggested that
the student could add the theory, if there was one, concerning the “wax bit” and to treat it as
an experiment, but one that she “did not do.” Jane, however, insisted that she needed to do
the experiment and explained that there is no theory “because there’s nobody who has done
an experiment like that.” Again, Carrie objected (marked by the contrastive conjunction
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“but”) by insisting that there had to be a reason for doing the experiment. Although Jane
did list a couple of reasons, the discussion of this topic ended with Carrie’s assertive query
“kay?” followed by Jane’s subdued, low-volume “yeap.” Carrie then apparently restated
what is to happen: Jane has to look up the edited assignment, and then provided reasons for
following the change of plans: it “makes life easier” for Jane, and she could “get a good
mark” for her analysis.
Jane provided signs that she was giving in and thinking about the new task condition. She
articulated a query about the amount of heat to be added, which would be made difficult
because of the hair dryer, but which might affect the speed with which the lantern would
rise. Carrie replied first by stating that the amount of air was determined by the size of the
lantern, and then articulating that the lantern had to be held in place until the hot air was
added, at which point it would be released. There was an exchange over when to turn off
the hair dryer, and then Carrie, as if she had heard Jane asking about the process, stated two
ways of understanding what would be happening: adding hot air or heating the air that is
there. Jane, initially providing signs of assent (head nod, “kay”) then articulated a possible
problem: “would the hair dryer not heat the air surrounding the lantern?” Carrie stated that
this was an interesting point that Jane could comment on.
The episode came to an end with an exchange of an assent-seeking query “kay?” and
the subdued giving of assent “yup,” upon which Carrie got up moving to another group,
leaving Jane by herself. It was at this point that the researcher present approached Jane
asking, “is that back to the drawing board for you, Jane?”
Coda to the Episode
Episodes and experiences such as the one featured here have not received much attention
in science education, though they may lastingly change what a student does and how she
does it in her further education. Such encounters change individuals because an “emotion-
ally experienced collision brings radical changes to the individual’s mind, and therefore it
is a sort of act of development of mental functions” (Veresov, 2010, p. 274). The lack of at-
tention might be partly due to the “superficial treatment” Dewey’s philosophy has received
despite its general acceptance on the parts of educational theorists and practitioners (Wong
& Pugh, 2001). Even when, and perhaps precisely because some science educators read
Dewey closely regarding the continuity of experience, they tend to heed the intellectually
mediated aspects of (aesthetic) experience rather than the pathic dimensions (e.g., Hamza &
Wickman, 2009; Wickman, 2006). The theory of experience toward which we are working,
however, takes the individual-in-setting as an irreducible whole, including those affective
features that are integral to the Vygotskian notion perezˇivanie (e.g., Veresov, 2010). In
the following, we analyze the episode just described focusing on two central aspects that
arise with the category of experience: (a) the open endedness (indeterminacy) of experience
that arises from its transactional nature and (b) the affective dimension of experience that
transcends the individual.
Transactions Lead to the Open-Ended Nature of Experience
Experience (perezˇivanie) in the way Dewey and Vygotsky define the category refers to
the transactional relation in which the subject and environment mutually constitute each
other. Dewey formulated the principle of continuity as follows: “every experience enacted
and undergone modifies the one who acts and undergoes, while this modification affects,
whether we wish it or not, the quality of subsequent experiences” (1938/2008b, p. 18). That
is, in experience, both the one who “enacts and undergoes” and “the quality of subsequent
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experiences” are transformed independently of any intention. Experience understood in this
way leads to the fact that teachers “cannot ever anticipate the unforeseeable and flowing,
continuous plenitude of possibilities that [even] a strongly Socratic conversation brings to
light in a wake, self-coordinating group” (Wagenschein, 1999, p. 98). In the course of events,
prior to the closure, the two participants cannot comprehend (grasp) what is happening to
them while it is happening (Romano, 1998; Roth, 2013a). Because episodes such as the
one in which Carrie and Jane are involved are unpredictable, an appropriate theory requires
categories that “capture” the indeterminate nature of experience. It is for this reason that
Dewey and Vygotsky suggest approaching such events through the analytical category of
experience (perezˇivanie). This category (minimal unit of analysis) includes all individuals,
their social/material setting, and the transactional relations that bind them into an irreducible
whole (Roth & Jornet, 2013). Affect is neither something separate from the unit nor a factor
that influences or characterizes a part of this unit: it perfuses the unit. We cannot therefore
understand the dynamic of the happening from the perspective or through the contributions
of the individual actors as if these were to determine its unitary character (in this case, we
would be looking at interactions of independent entities and not at transactions [Dewey &
Bentley, 1949/1999]). As the German physics educator Wagenschein (1999) recognized,
even in a strongly Socratic classroom conversation, “the teacher cannot know ahead of time
what he will say at which turns of the road” (p. 98) because s/he cannot know ahead of
time what students will say; and students cannot anticipate what they will say even seconds
hence because they do not know what the teacher will have said when s/he has ended.
Most learning theories privilege the intentional and rational aspects of experience, where
individual agents are in control of what they experience (Lave, 1988; Wong, 2007). In
contrast, Dewey emphasizes that the control of individual actions resides in the situation
and that it “is not the will or desire of any one person which establishes order but the moving
spirit of the whole group” (1938/2008b, p. 33). In addition, “the authority in question when
exercised in a well-regulated household or other community group is not a manifestation
of merely personal will; the parent or teacher exercises it as the representative and agent of
the interests of the group as a whole” (p. 33). The teacher does not exercise in an arbitrary
way: “When it is necessary . . . to speak and act firmly, it is done in behalf of the interest
of the group, not as an exhibition of personal power” (p. 34). The category of experience,
therefore, covers this dimension in which events are not (completely) under the control of
the individual subjects. Teachers and students, as Carrie and Jane in the episode, are not
only agential speakers but also subject and subjected to the speech of others—that is, they
are patients as much as agents. As a result, the happening carries Carrie and Jane away,
makes them undergo and go through something that never is under the control of either.
They fully comprehend what has happened only after the fact. It is from the condition of
being subject and subjected to something that much of the emotional coloring arises—even
though and precisely because neither participant has control over what is happening. The
grade that issues at the end, therefore, needs to be understood as the result of the experience
as a whole, involving Carrie and Jane, the social/material setting, and the transactional
relations that not only bind them into an irreducible whole but also constitute them as the
particular actors that they are (e.g., Roth, 2013b). Jane merely gets stuck with the failing
grade and the lack of competencies that are associated with it. She also gets stuck with
“a loss of interest,” which, as we show here, in part arises from a situation that makes
it impossible for her to continue with her experiment and to take on board another one
designed by someone else.
In the episode, although the teacher initiated the exchange with the idea of communicating
to Jane a change of plans, she could not anticipate what would happen, how the exchange
would unfold, or when precisely it would end. Jane, too, could not know what would be
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happening when Carrie approached her. Both, therefore, though active contributors to the
event, also were subject and subjected to it. They were undergoing the event as much as
producing it. As a result, the course the exchange was taking and what was said emerged.
This is precisely how Bakhtin (1994) characterizes dialogical relations, such that even
the authors of dialogical novel—such as F. Dostoyevsky—do not know beforehand the
destinations of their characters until the dialogue has ended.
Throughout the episode there are affective signs that the two protagonists made available
to each other and that they took up in their replies. There is indeed evidence that Jane
had engaged considerably in efforts to design and prepare for a scientific experiment; yet
subsequent interviews with the teacher, including one at the end of the term, revealed
that Jane turned off during this lesson and lost interest for the extended experimental
investigation for the remainder of the term. In the end, Jane was the only student who did not
receive a passing grade. Though the example does not lend itself to make causal claims, this
experience—consistent with Dewey’s (1938/2008b) conceptualization—was an experience
that appears to have shaped how Jane subsequently engaged with the investigation (i.e.,
subsequent experience) and, therefore, the experience of the entire school term as a whole.
Certainly, the teacher had not intended for Jane to lose interest; she asserted repeatedly
wanting to make the task manageable for Jane so that she could succeed. Despite these
intentions, the outcomes of the transactional experience were different.
The indeterminacy of events that arise from transactions also shows itself in the fact that
despite good intentions, classroom episodes initiated by a teacher to bring about something
positive—making a task easier—the actual outcomes might include dispute and negative
affect. Carrie summarized and characterized the event as one of objections: “So and Jenny
did balk at it all. As much as it’s making life easier for her, she wants to do her own thing
so hopefully it doesn’t put her off too much and she does get on with it. She’s also not
working with anyone. . . . She said she wanted to do it by herself because she wants to
be proud of her own work I think.” As described in our narrative account, Jane did in fact
provide reasons to support her request—which turned into a plea—to continue with the
experiment as originally planned. The event, following the announcement of a change of
plans, therefore did involve discussion, opposing arguments, and debate—by definition, a
dispute. In Education and Experience, Dewey does indeed talk about how disputes arise
in and from experience. When disputes arise, “it is usually on the alleged ground that the
umpire or some person on the other side is being unfair; in other words that in such cases
some individual is trying to impose his individual will on someone else” (1938/2008b,
p. 33).
Dewey already knew about the more difficult task for the progressive educator, who
“must be aware of the potentialities for leading students into new fields which belong to
experiences already had, and must use this knowledge as his criterion for selection and
arrangement of the conditions that influence their present experience” (1938/2008b, p.
50). In the episode, and despite the teacher’s stated intentions, the conditions for learning
appeared “to be settled upon outside the present life-experience of the learner” (p. 51). Carrie
“always thought that that topic wasn’t the best for [Jane] because it’s not as straight forward.
They’re meant to be making a lantern rise through tea-light candles. We have simplified
the problem and adding hot air to the lantern, seeing how quickly it can rise.” However,
what for the teacher was anticipated as a simplification turned out to be a disconnection
for the student. From a purely intellectual point of view on the subject matter, an educator
may assume an isomorphism between tea-light candles and hair dryers in their function of
warming up the air, so that a lantern will rise in either case. With regard to the “science
behind,” the two may be analogous to the same scientific principle, and function equally
well in a science (learning) experiment, save that the hair dryer solution may “make life
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easier.” However, as Dewey insisted and this study suggests, relations within the curriculum
do not necessarily bear connections within lived-in experience:
Thinking goes on in trains of ideas, but the ideas form a train only because they are
much more than what an analytic psychology calls ideas. They are phases, emotionally
and practically distinguished, of a developing underlying quality . . . subtle shadings of a
pervading and developing hue. (1934/2008a, p. 44)
For Jane, the hue of the unfolding experience was constituted by a series of irreducible
emotional, practical, and intellectual shadings that, according to her actions and statements,
did not seem to make up the expected connection between candles and hair dryers despite
their coherence within the curriculum.
Throughout the episode, we get a good sense of the indeterminacy that is characteristic
of life as an open-ended phenomenon and that makes actual outcomes differ from intended
ones. Observers, witnesses, and the participants do not know what precisely is happening,
which they could name and point to; they cannot do so until after everything has come to an
end, when everything will have been said and done, and not until then has an event emerged.
As a category, experience is designed to capture how the continuing, open-ended flow of a
happening is reflected in the consciousness and affect of the participants. We observe the
Deweyan intellectual, practical (gestural), and affective “intakings and outgivings” without
ever being able to gauge the quality of this experience as (namable) experience or the ways
in which it would modify (mediate) future experiences in the continuity of experience.
Affective Dimensions of Experience Transcend the Individual
Stating that the affective dimensions of experience cannot be reduced to the individual
amounts to saying that they cannot be explained by focusing on individuals, their inter-
pretations, constructions, physiological, and hormonal make-up, and so on. Because the
category of experience/perezˇivanie covers the entirety of individual–acting/being-affected–
in-setting, affect, which is a manifestation of experience as a whole, cannot be explained by
considering individuals alone. Scholars working with the category of experience all point
to the role of the pathic dimension: in experience, affect, intellect, and practical action are
woven into one cloth (Bakhtin, 1993; Dewey, 1934/2008a; Vygotskij, 1984; Waldenfels,
2002). But this dimension does not mean that affect is the result of interpretations. Instead,
as recent research in science and in mathematics education shows, affect is continuously
produced and transformed such that from negative affective qualities, both positive and
even more negative affect may result without the actors being conscious of this (Roth &
Radford, 2011; Roth & Tobin, 2010). Activity—which is the smallest unit that retains
the societal characteristics that explain consciousness and personality—is inherently and
irreducibly perfused with affect (Leont’ev, 1983). We know from both Jane and her teacher
Carrie that the event has had affective dimensions: Carrie having to do what she did not
really want to do (i.e., tell Jane that she had to change her investigation), and Jane having
an experience that “suck[ed].” Carrie also stated feeling that she had to attend more to
Jane’s needs. Clearly, this is the kind of situation and associations we might anticipate to
be able to witness if Dewey is right in asserting that “there is some kind of continuity in
any case since every experience affects for better or worse the attitudes which help decide
the quality of further experiences” (1938/2008b, p. 20). This is so whether one is a teacher
or a student, and Dewey’s framework about educational experiences—though he did not
explicitly frame it as such—is as valid for the teacher who gains experience in and through
experience as it is for the student.
Science Education, Vol. 98, No. 1, pp. 106–126 (2014)
116 ROTH AND JORNET
The most important among the attitudes to be developed in and through experience is “the
desire to go on learning” (Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 29). In Jane’s case, this desire, though it
was initially apparent to Carrie, later disappeared. When asked about the extended exper-
imental inquiry, Carrie noted at the end of the term: “some girls in some groups didn’t sort
of take that struggle on and that challenge on and do anything with it.” When asked to elab-
orate, she used the example of Jane, about whom Carrie said that she “never really engaged
in any of it much,” and that “she was quite enthusiastic to begin with but it didn’t carry her
very far. She didn’t take any of that enthusiasm and apply it to anything.” Carrie also stated
to “know that during that lesson [Jane] switched off.” She said that “at the end she was over
chatting with Rita, not doing anything . . . . There are things that she can be doing but I think
she’ll get back on track.” Although experience is said to build on and to be constrained
by previous experience, the principle of continuity does not inherently mean growth or
development. It may in fact “operate so as to leave a person arrested on a low plane of
development, in a way which limits later capacity for growth” (Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 20).
The category of experience includes an affective coloring that cannot be separated out
from its practical and intellectual colorings. In fact, there is a continuous interplay of the
practical, intellectual, and affective: even the emergence of an intellectual understanding
is affectively colored. This interplay does not take place in the private sphere of thought,
but is a public phenomenon, empirically available in and through embodied transactions.
Throughout the episode, we can see and hear how the participants produce and make
available to each other the affective, cognitive, and practical aspects of the unfolding
activity, without these existing in any exclusive modality or parcel of materiality. Thus, for
example, in taking up the announcement of the change of plans and the following reasons
for it, Jane utters a plaintive “I just found a way to do it,” which cannot be said to involve
separable intellectual and affective aspects. Rather, in one and the same conversational
turn, Jane’s voice articulates (a) an affective evaluation (intonation), (b) a negation (having
found a solution in contrast to the teacher’s provided reasons for the change of plans), and
(c) a reason for continuing with the design (“I found a way . . . ”).
Because of the irreducibility of the practical, intellectual, and affective, emotions fea-
turing in this episode—such as disappointment or empathy—should not be taken to be
the result of interpretation. Rather, from a cultural–historical perspective, there are stark
warnings of the grave error we commit if we understood the affective evaluation as a
result of the intellectual dimensions and interpretation of what someone else has said
(Vygotskij, 1984). Emotion is not a reaction apart from the “reasoning” or the experience,
but is integral to the passing “from somewhere . . . toward an end” (Dewey, 1934/2008a,
p. 46). In the episode, intellectually and practically, there is a change of plan; this change is
associated with affective qualities, as there had been emotional investments toward a goal
that now is in the process of disappearing. As Jane noted, going with her mother shopping
to buy “all this stuff” “was fun,” that is, was colored by and produced positive affect. The
practical aspects of preparing for the experiments were colored by and mediated further af-
fective investment. But this is not all. The experience of the exchange itself puts the subject
at and exposes it to risk, and such risk, however small, inherently has an affective coloring.
Indeed, after the fact, Jane referred to the change of plan as “really annoying because I
had everything planned and I knew what exactly I wanted to do.” If it turned out that the
described event contributed to the loss of interest and abandonment and the “switch[ing]
off,” this might not come as a surprise, for “the principle of continuity of experience means
that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and
modifies in some way the quality of those which come after” (Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 19).
There is an extended aspect of experience that exceeds the single individual. In the
episode, disappointment and empathy are better described as qualities of a category that
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unfolds in time and which includes both participants and their transactions, than as the
external expression of “internal” experiences. In Carrie’s uptake of Jane’s first signs of
disappointment, we find expressions of acknowledgment of Jane’s position and a lowering
of the pitch that has the effect of decreasing the conflictual nature of different ideas generally
and between students and science teachers specifically (Roth & Tobin, 2010). That is, in
Carrie’s turn we observe an acknowledgment of Jane’s intellectual–affective expressions
just described. There is a coordination (transaction) of the melodic move between Jane’s
and Carrie’s turns in conversation, where tonalities sound in a “coherent” (in that they are
continuous and responsive to each other, again transactional) symphony that is not over
or below experience, and which do not fully pertain to any single participant. Emotional
qualities are written all over this experience, not because the researcher interprets it as
such but because the participants themselves respond to each other’s affective expressions.
Emotions, coloring, and being colored by events, as they do, “are not, save in pathological
instances, private” (Dewey, 1934/2008a, p. 48).
All experience has affective qualities that shade the experience, transform it, and are,
in turn, transformed by the unfolding experience (Bakhtin, 1993; Dewey, 1934/2008a;
Vygotskij, 1935/2001). Affect is not just a garnish to events and experience: “Emotion
is the moving and cementing force” (p. 49, emphasis added). Dewey thereby highlights
precisely the same aspect that is also central to the idea of the motive forces underlying
thought (Vygotskij, 2005). Throughout, affective quality of the event as a whole is apparent.
It not only was a driving force of what was happening, but also was its product. After the
fact, Carrie talked about the intentions that she had for the conversation with Jane. In this
description, addressing the anticipated effect that the announcement of a change of plans
might have stands out: “I think I was, I sort of knew that she wouldn’t be particularly
happy with it and I guess I approached her with the idea that I wanted her to feel that
it was a good thing rather than meaning she’d done all this work and it was wasted etc.
etc.” That is, Carrie’s after-the-fact description suggests the presence of a certain degree of
sympathy and empathy with the anticipated affective impact that the news would have on
Jane—and, therefore, the affective coloring of her own (speech) action. The ultimate “aim
of the conversation [was] to let [Jane] know that this was what was happening but have her
feel that it was okay.” But there is no evidence that Carrie could have anticipated the precise
effect that the announcement would have, how it would affect Jane, and how Jane would
respond to it practically, intellectually, and emotionally. In fact, she came to be confronted
with and affected by Jane’s “balking,” and the perhaps unanticipated degree to which the
news affected Jane. And the fact that Jane was indeed affected was apparent to Carrie
through a variety of means including intellectual content, prosody, body positions, and
facial expressions. Afterward, Carrie acknowledged her understanding that the experience
was more upsetting for Jane than anticipated: “Jane, I guess I feel, I feel a bit more aware
of making sure I say things that won’t, I guess, upset her in a way, whether it’s how I say
it or how I try and put things to make sure she doesn’t get off track. . . . Not so much
upset Jane but not have Jane upset.” Here, Carrie described her intended concerns for
Jane’s emotional well-being, and refers to the upset that the event has ostensibly caused in
Jane.
Carrie’s talk did in fact embody a concern for Jane in the future, as she articulated for
Jane that a change of plans would make things easier, give her a set of data to work with,
and get a good mark on this part of her course. She acted as the “educator [who] by the
very nature of his work is obliged to see his present work in terms of what it accomplishes,
or fails to accomplish, for a future whose objects are linked with those of the present”
(Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 50). The educator looks ahead, concerned with experiences that
live on to influence further experiences. “The educator, by the very nature of his work is
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obliged to see his present work in terms of what it accomplishes, or fails to accomplish, for
a future whose objects are linked with those of the present” (p. 50). Thus, intervening prior
to the negative experiences and emotions that might come from the failure of continued
effort to make the experiment “work” count among those that educators often attempt to
accomplish. However, this is a sword with two edges, as the situation is more complicated
than it might appear from the philosopher’s comments. This is so because a change of plans
intervenes precisely with going through a situation that Jane has chosen for herself. The
situation conflicts with another condition of experience the philosopher specifies: the one
concerning control over the conditions.
TOWARD A THEORY OF EXPERIENCE
In the preceding section, we presented an episode from a classroom, where students learn
physics by doing extended experimental investigations. The episode might be considered
mundane and reduced to a one-sentence statement: “The teacher, Carrie, told the student
(Jane) that she had to change what she wanted to investigate.” The episode, however, as
Carrie said during an interview after the term, had lasting impact in that Jane, who had
been very eager initially, had lost interest and ended up being the only student in the school
with a failing physics grade for this term. Vygotsky and Dewey suggest that to theorize
such events, we require the category experience that is spread over individuals and the
settings in which they both act and are subject/ed to social/material environment. Out of the
continuous stream of experience, consciousness and affect mark some in a way that they
become remarkable, stand out as an experience. In the following, we highlight dimensions
of a theory of experience that leads us to an appropriate understanding of what happened
to Carrie and Jane. In the following sections, we articulate four aspects that a theory of
experience has to contain: (a) experience manifests itself in/as passions, (b) experience
integrates over space and time, (c) experience is a moving force, and (d) experience is
transformation.
Experience Manifests Itself in/as Passions (Affect, Emotion)
The subject is that which suffers, is subjected and which endures resistance and frustration;
it is also that which attempts subjection of hostile conditions. (Dewey, 1929, p. 239)
In our episode, Carrie and Jane affected each other and the situation as a whole. Carrie’s
subsequently stated intent was to tell Jane that she had to change her experiment; and Jane,
in and through her “balking,” did not allow rapid closure. Neither knew what the other would
be saying, and, therefore, what they would be saying even seconds hence from where they
were at any given instant in time. Experience is an appropriate category for capturing these
dimensions, for they are part of its etymological heritage. Experience (perezˇivanie) in its
original sense—in English and Russian as well as in the French expe´rience or the German
equivalent Erfahrung—suggests that in contrast to the repetition of something, experience
is related to travel, traversal, peril, risk, and change. The Proto-Indo-European root per(e)-
denotes the verbs to try, dare, and risk, put oneself in danger; as such, it also made it into
such words as experiment (Greek peı´rama, experiment) and perilous. That is, the category
of experience includes risk and putting oneself in danger, and, therefore, our continued
exposure to the world that is beyond our intentions and control. A second sense has made it
into many modern languages: to carry over, bring, to go over, fare. As such, the root refers
to transition, going through and undergoing something. We are affected, which also means
Science Education, Vol. 98, No. 1, pp. 106–126 (2014)
TOWARD A THEORY OF EXPERIENCE 119
that we cannot anticipate all that comes with subjecting oneself to experience. There is a
third sense in which the root has made it to the modern day: to go over, leading toward (e.g.,
“far,” “afar”), further, later, forward (prone, pronate) toward the end, a limit (perimeter).
That is, experience is both a process and that which, at its limit, the process gives rise to:
that of which the experience is an experience is an event. We do not control events: we live
through and undergo them (as witnesses, patients, advenants) as much as we are agential
subjects therein (Romano, 1998).
The etymological roots of the term experience show that there is more to experience than
what we can intend. This more, therefore, exceeds what we know. Experience affects us
in ways that we can come to understand only after the event has come to an end; and it
affects us before we can understand what has happened. Research in science education has
recently turned attention toward these more receptive, aesthetic dimensions of experience
(Pugh & Girod, 2007). A study of students’ development exhibited the perceptual and
discursive differentiations of “what does belongs and what does not belong in science class”
(Jakobson & Wickman, 2008, p. 62). However, “the idea that human experience involves
elements beyond our intentional control” (Wong, 2007, p. 203) has been underestimated
and undertheorized.
Having an experience—one that is “integrated within and demarcated in the general
stream of experience from other experiences” (Dewey, 1934/2008a, p. 43) as opposed to
mere “automatic reflexes” of no significant contribution to further development—involves
a “balance,” a “proportion” of doing and undergoing: “Unbalance on either side blurs the
perception of relations and leaves the experience partial and distorted” (p. 51). Lust for
completion (an excess of agency) results in an experience “so dispersed and miscellaneous
as hardly to deserve the name” (p. 51). An excess of receptivity leads to an equally distorted
experience “because nothing takes root in mind when there is no balance between doing
and receiving” (p. 51–52). Reception means that we are given a gift; and gifts, as recent
phenomenological analyses show, lie beyond our intentions (Marion, 1997). In this dialectic
between doing and receiving, agency and reception are set in coconstitutive motion.
As Dewey, cultural–historical psychologists emphasize that activity cannot be “re-
duced to volitional processes and volitional experiences” (Vygotskij, 2005, p. 652). The
passions—what we are subject and subjected to, including suffering and pain—are an in-
tegral and irreducible part of experience generally (Vygotskij, 1984). For this reason, we
lack control over events: “[a]esthetic activity as well is powerless to take possession of
that moment of Being which is constituted by the transitiveness and open-eventness
of Being” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 1). A theory of experience must include this openended-
ness of “lived-life,” which, as we see in the episode, affects Carrie and Jane in ways that
they could not anticipate (i.e., know in advance). But open-endedness means that there are
limits to the extent that science teachers can plan the outcomes of the curriculum that they
prepare (Wagenschein, 1999).
Experience Integrates Over Space and Time
In the episode, one word, statement, or turn arose from and led to another. There was
a continued flux in which the give and take between Carrie and Jane took place; and this
give and take in fact produced the (conversational, eventual) flux. In and reflecting the
unfolding event-specific relation, we observe manifestations of affect that Jane and Carrie
make available to each other. An appropriate category of experience, therefore, has to
capture the spatial distribution—here across Carrie and Jane—temporal flux, and affect
as determined and determining manifestation. Dewey and Vygotsky propose the category
experience (perezˇivanie) to do precisely that. Experience is a category of analysis that
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includes the individual and its world (environment). When we observe some happening,
therefore, what is happening cannot be understood based on characteristics of the individual,
as (radical) constructivist approaches do, or in terms of the environment, as behaviorist
psychology did (Roth & Jornet, 2013). This irreducibility of organism and environment
in the study of behavior is a recurrent topic throughout Dewey’s writings, a unit that he
already postulated in his early work (Dewey, 1896). The parts of the irreducible analytic
unit—for example, environment and person—cannot be understood as independent entities
acting by themselves or as given elements of an interaction. This approach is consistent
with unit analysis over analysis by elements (Vygotskij, 1935/2001, 2005). It is precisely
because experience integrates across time and environments that it allows us to understand
living through and undergoing an experience anew rather than repeating it under constraint
(Waldenfels, 2011), as the empiricist tradition seems to suggest. Experience then is to be
understood in this way: “when a name is wanted to emphasize the interconnectedness of
all concerns, affairs, pursuits, etc., and it is made clear that experience is used in that way,
it may serve the purpose better than any word that is as yet available” (Dewey & Bentley,
1949/1999, p. 187). As a result, “[t]he word ‘experience’ should be dropped entirely from
discussion unless held strictly to a single definite use: that, namely, of calling attention to the
fact that Existence has organism and environment as its aspects, and can not be identified
with either as an independent isolate” (p. 193). Empirical contributions in science education
have come close to these ideas when operationalizing the students’ recalls during learning
activities not as “actualizations” of given experiences that have already been had, but
as reactualizations in which prior experiences are made significant in current experience
throughout situated, joint action (Lidar, Almqvist, & ¨Ostman, 2010).
Experience Is a Moving Force
Experience is a moving force. Its value can be judged only on the ground of what it moves
toward and into. (Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 21)
The actual dynamic unity of consciousness, that is, the total of which there is consciousness,
will be an experience. (Vygotskij, 1983, p. 383)
When we observe Carrie and Jane, their conversation appears to have an internal force.
One turn leads to another, taking up (from) and completing the preceding turn at talk,
while opening up another. The path the conversation is taking—even though there is an
intended outcome that may likely be achieved given the ruling relations between teacher and
student in an elite school—unpredictably arises from the sequentially ordered turns at talk.
The momentum of the conversation, both its rate and its instantaneous directions, comes
from within the conversation itself. To capture this aspect, Dewey and Vygotsky propose
considering experience as a moving force. This character of experience is so important that
“[f]ailure to take the moving force of an experience into account so as to judge and direct
it on the ground of what it is moving into means disloyalty to the principle of experience
itself” (Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 21). The category of experience denotes movement/change
itself, which affords a holistic way of theorizing the situated nature of cognition (Roth
& Jornet, 2013). This implies that it simultaneously refers to a learner throughout the
entire course of a science laboratory investigation (Lidar, Lundqvist, & ¨Ostman, 2006).
Experience therefore cannot be captured by means of a noun that denotes a thing: it is
movement and force, simultaneously. “Experience” names “this dialectical movement that
consciousness exercises on itself and that affects both its knowledge and its object, in as
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much as the new true object issues from it” (Hegel, 1807/1979, p. 78, original emphasis,
underline added). A precedent for a self-moving system is economy (Marx/Engels, 1962).
Thus, Marx elaborates “the system of capitalist relations as a ‘self-developing system,’ as a
concreteness closed in itself, of which the motive forces of development lie within itself, in
its internal contradictions, in the immanent contradictions of the economic form” (Il’enkov,
1982, p. 121). However, “unless the productive forces develop, no ‘internal’ dialectics of
the system . . . will produce an evolution” (p. 121). Therefore, experience, if it is to be a
force, must itself encompass change. This is precisely what Dewey makes a requirement
of his theory of the continuity of experience: “Every genuine experience has an active side
which changes in some degree the objective conditions under which experiences are had”
(1938/2008b, p. 22). In the unity of experience, the development of the forces is to be taken
“not by itself, not only as a cause, but also as a consequence, result, and product of the
reverse action of the system of production relations on the productive forces” (Il’enkov,
1982, p. 121). The production relations exist in the transactions within and constituting the
system that for Dewey manifests itself as context and individual.
Experience Is Transformation
Carrie subsequently described the episode as a transformative one. First, she noted that
Jane was losing interest, and this loss was tied to the point in time when the student was
asked/forced to change her experiment rather than doing it in the way she wanted. Second,
the event also changed Carrie, who noted that it had made her more aware of the needs
of students, of having become aware that she needed to express herself in ways that do
not upset students. That is, the event, as an experience, was transformative. Dewey and
Vygotsky created the analytical category to denote transitions: from a first object and the
knowledge about it into a second object that experience is said to be about. Experience is a
traversal of the self into the self, “the advent of the self in itself in the absolute difference
with itself” (Romano, 1998, p. 197). This change is not the change of a subject identical
with itself right to the core of its changes (e.g., the same before and after its construction
of an “identity”), but a “coming of self in the self in the absolute difference with itself” (p.
197). Thus, in experience there is a process of transformation that exceeds any intention or
anticipation, and of which Dewey was well aware. In that process, “the old self is put off and
the new self is only forming, and the form it finally takes will depend upon the unforeseeable
result of an adventure” (1929, p. 246, emphasis added). Researchers concerned with the
aesthetic aspects of (science) learning have pointed out the need to consider not only the
conceptual and discursive aspects of students’ interactions, but highlight that we need to
consider science learning also as “something to be swept-up in” (Girod, Rau, & Schepige,
2003, p. 575). These authors consider the goal of science education to be not only to
teach students concepts, but to facilitate “transformative, aesthetic experiences” that will
transform the way the students approach the world after having these learning experiences,
and have called upon the science education community to attend more carefully to these
issues (Pugh, 2011; Pugh & Girod, 2007). Throughout this study, we provide an account
for just what it means for an experience to be transformative, an account that is entirely
consistent with the nondualist, nonteleological, and antirepresentationalist stance that marks
the philosophical traditions we bring together here.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study is to (a) contribute to the building of a theory of experience
that takes into account recent philosophical developments of the analytic category and, in
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so doing, (b) raise science educators’ awareness about the importance of the phenomenon
of experience to education and learning. For Dewey, experience is the means and goal of
education. It is the means, because experience is a traversal, a going through, and exposure
to the unknown (and therefore alien). It is the goal of education, because any (significant)
experience arises some of the flux of inchoate experiences. Teachers can speak out of
experience only because they have gone through and been exposed to experiences; it is
only through a number of significant experiences that they become experienced as teachers.
For Dewey, as for Vygotsky, experience (perezˇivanie) is an encompassing category, a unit
that differently and differentially manifests itself in and through its practical, intellectual,
and emotional shadings. The reality of the encompassing experience is reflected differently
in, and manifests itself differently to, any individual participant. The dimensions (man-
ifestations) of this unit cannot be considered in isolation—that is, as elements—without
losing the phenomenon because the practical always also is intellectual and emotional, the
emotional always also is shaded practically and intellectually, and the emotional always
also has an intellectual and practical side.
In this study, we highlight the fact that the emotional (affective) dimension is an integral
aspect of the intellectual—it is not the result of an interpretation—because the intellectual
itself is perfused with affect. A case study is provided that exhibits the relation of these
dimensions in a teacher-student meeting concerning a change of plans in the design of an
extended empirical investigation. Our analysis shows how the affective dimension is tied
to the intellectual issue of the experimental design. The case study was chosen because
students’ experience in and with science arises from many such individual experiences
that recursively shape future experiences. We suggest that a better understanding of the
continuity of experience, in the sense of Dewey (1938/2008b) or Leont’ev (1983), is
required for understanding the role of science education in the development of personality.
In this text, we chose an event in which conceptual aspects are more tangential. Bluntly
stated, a science teacher tells (attempts to convince) her student that she cannot pursue the
investigation for which she has already purchased all the necessary equipment but rather
has to do another one. Our choice of the episode was explicit because the subsequent
comments on the part of participants appear to suggest that it was “an experience” in the
Deweyan sense, that is, an experience that made a difference in and to the lives of the two
protagonists. It made a difference in the way in which Jane related to and engaged with
physics, and perhaps with science more generally. A pragmatic approach highlights for us
the importance to consider such experiences, for the perhaps “greatest of all pedagogical
fallacies is the notion that a person learns only the particular thing he is studying at the time”
(Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 29). Perhaps even more important than the intellectual aspect of a
particular science lesson is what students learn without intending it—that is, “the formation
of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes” (p. 29). Some science education research has
highlighted this dimension, using the Deweyan term “collateral learning” (e.g., Lundqvist,
Almqvist, & ¨Ostman, 2009). Concerning content-related experience, it would be “a mistake
to suppose that the mere acquisition of a certain amount of arithmetic, geography, history,
etc., which is taught and studied because it may be useful at some time in the future, has this
effect” (Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 28) just as it would be “a mistake to suppose that acquisition
of skills in reading and figuring will automatically constitute preparation for their right and
effective use under conditions very unlike those in which they were acquired” (p. 28). That
is, Dewey suggests that we should not expect the transfer between specific experiences
even though they are part of the flux of experience. That is, an experience in one situation,
and the “skills” we develop therein, is not automatically mobilized later, especially under
conditions unlike those in which they were originally experienced (e.g., Lave, 1988). Thus,
the way in which Jane has been changed in the course of this experience may be in terms
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of how she experiences the quality of subsequent events in science classrooms. This, more
so than doing or not doing an investigation, may have led to loss of interest, withdrawal,
and failure in this course and, perhaps, science in general.
Throughout this paper, we point to the mutual interdependence of environment and
person, and, therefore, to the fact that the same environment will influence the continuous
flux of experience (development) in very different ways. Thus, for science teachers to
contribute to the education of their students, “must have a long look ahead” “to see [their]
present work in terms of what it accomplishes, or fails to accomplish, for a future whose
objects are linked with those of the present” (Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 50). They therefore
“need to be able to find the relationship that exists between the child and its environment,
the (emotional) experience [perezˇivanie] of the child, in other words, how a child becomes
conscious of, comprehends, emotionally relates to a certain event” (Vygotskij, 1935/2001,
p. 75). This will assist them in adapting their actions to lead to an experience such that
it has a positive influence on the science student’s growth. Here again, the intellectual is
inseparable from the affective, for the nature of the steps to be taken, the nature of the
design of the experiment Jane will undertake, is irreducible related to the further affective
moment and, therefore, to her subsequent experiences and the experience of the physics
course as a whole.
Current science education theorizing often makes thematic boundaries and borders,
which learners are said to have to cross—including the notions of border crossing, boundary
worker, and third space in science classrooms (e.g., Aikenhead, 1996; Akkerman & Bakker,
2011; Tan, Barton, & Lim, 2009). In the same way as cultural–historical activity theorists
(e.g., Bakhtin, 1993; Leont’ev, 1983), Dewey (1938/2008b) emphasizes the continuity of
experience in the face of difference. Thus, even if students were crossing boundaries, such
events would themselves be experiences in the continuity of experience and integrated into
the developing personality—which is what has been shown in the transitions between school
and workplace apprenticeships among electricians (e.g., Roth, 2012b). Dewey (1938/2008b)
writes that every experience takes up something from previous experiences and modifies
not only subsequent experiences but also the one who acts in and undergoes the experience.
This is so in any case, “since every experience affects for better or worse the attitudes
which help decide the quality of further experiences, by setting up certain preference and
aversion, and making it easier or harder to act for this or that end” (p. 20). This also
means that experience never is precisely the same, always is something new, because once
occurrent (Bakhtin, 1993). Because experience is always new, it does not signify other than
the transformational process itself.
Wong & Pugh, 2001 argue against the widely held and naı¨ve view often attributed to
Dewey that students will learn better science by the very fact that they generate scientific
ideas by themselves instead of by passively learning them from instruction. Indeed, the
debate concerning whether instruction is to be teacher led (direct instruction) or student
led (free exploration) often falls within a dichotomous views in which either-or positions
seem to be the only alternatives (e.g., Kirschner, Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Mayer, 2004).
Moreover, the discussion is always held in terms of the emergence (either from within
or from without) of “conceptual” structures (e.g., Kapur, 2008). Considering learning
experiences as indivisible units of intellect, emotion, and praxis, however, suggests the
need of avoiding discourses that limit themselves to intellectual dimensions, as this often
is the case in our field. Emerging approaches in science education that already assume
such irreducibility of the category of experience exist. Such is the case of the practical
epistemology analysis framework (Lidar, Almqvist, & ¨Ostman, 2010; Wickman & ¨Ostman,
2002). Investigating how students “fill gaps” that are noticed in “encounters” with others
and with the world, researchers applying this framework have shown that there is more to
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science learning than generalized conceptual and propositional explanations; the contingent,
material aspects of the learning situation usually involve learning to make and recognize as
continuous perceptual distinctions that emerge as learners participate in normative practices
(e.g., Hamza & Wickman, 2009, 2013). The category described in this study suggests that
such analytical frameworks may be expanded so as to capture not only how students
“construct” new relations across situations, but also how students are subject and subjected
to these new relations that, if not considered to be reduced to the individual, must emerge
in the ongoing societal relation prior to any grasping of what “stands fast” in a situation.
The inherent motion implied in the category of experience suggests that the discussion
must avoid one-sided interpretations of learning as processes of “construction” or “appro-
priation.” According to Vygotsky, the final form of child development is already present
in its initial moments, because it is the societal relation that forms part of the unit of
perezˇivanie (experience) that will affect and be affected by its own confronting to itself
(Vygotskij, 1935/2001). Thus, “something which is only supposed to take shape at the
very end of development, somehow influences the very first steps in this development” (p.
84, original emphasis). This makes possible considerations of learning as coming from
within the unit of experience, yet being something inherently strange to it. It is the dramatic
collision between people in experience (Veresov, 2010) that “takes root in the mind” and
comes to influence the objective conditions (internal and external to the individual) in which
further experiences are had. Similarly, in Dewey’s account, it is in the collision between
anticipation and consummation that experiences acquire “vital” character and therefore
come to be integrated into the continuity of experience and, hence, in future (learning)
experiences. What these two lines of argument suggest is that both the notions of “direct
instruction” and that of “pure discovery” are at odds with a view of learning as part of vital
(significant) experiences. Scholars in the cognitive and learning sciences have for long time
claimed that, despite what seems to be the most extended belief, the biggest challenge that
educators face is not to develop better learning materials, but to stimulate students’ desire
for learning (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).
Experience is an important category for science educators, because “it is impossible to
obtain an understanding of present social forces . . . apart from an education which leads
learners into knowledge of the very same facts and principles which in their final organiza-
tion constitute the sciences” (Dewey, 1938/2008b, p. 54). That is, both as an introduction to
the habit of becoming a scientist as well as to understanding social forces more generally,
experiences in/with/of science as part of schooling are tremendously important. The rela-
tionship between relevant experiences and education are intimate and necessary. However,
the progressive organization of subject matter should reside in present experience, orga-
nized in a way that “is free, not externally imposed, because it is in accord with the growth
of experience itself” (p. 55). Grounding future in current science experiences constitutes
“the basic principle of using existing experience as the means of carrying learners on to a
wider, more refined, and better organized environing world, physical and human, than is
found in the experiences from which educative growth sets out” (p. 55).
Experience is a category that leads us to see and analyze classroom events in ways that
differ from current practices in our field. The holistic way of approaching science learning
questions the reduction of classroom events to (the minds of) individuals. The latter tend
to be thought of as the agents that bring about the events rather than as patients who are
subject and subjected to events that are never under their (complete) control. The category
experience (perezˇivanie), in the form of irreducible individual-acting-in-and-affected-by-
the-setting units, constitutes challenges to the current constructivist epistemology that
privileges the self-sufficient constructing mind.
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